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COMMENTS

THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND
PRIVACY ACT: DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT
FOR SIMILAR TECHNOLOGY, CUTTING THE
CORD OF PRIVACY
It has often been noted that the development of electronic communications has brought the people of our Nation and the world closer
together, and has served to create new business and personal relationships and to enhance old ones. With these benefits, unfortunately, the
development of electronic communications has also provided unscrupulous individuals with the opportunity to intrude upon the privacy
of a conversation through the use of wiretaps or radio receiving
devices.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

When Alexander Graham Bell made his dream of talking
through wires a reality,2 he probably never imagined some day people would eliminate the need for wires altogether. In the past, although communications over any distance were difficult,3 with the
1. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 1986: Hearings on H.R. 3378
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice
of the Comm. on the Judiciary House of Reps., 99th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. 27 (1985-

86) (statement of Philip J. Quigley, President and CEO, Pactel Mobile Co.'s) [hereinafter Hearings].

2. Alexander Graham Bell was a speech teacher from Boston. R. BRUCE, ALEX100-02 (1973). In his spare time
he worked on inventing the telephone. Id. at 104. He was racing against the efforts of
Elisha Gray who was also trying to invent the telephone. Id. at 119, 143 and 167-68.
By late June, early July of 1875, Bell had invented a device that could transmit the
human voice over a wire. Id. at 145-47. Bell received a patent for his device on March
7, 1876. Id. at 174. However, it was not until March 10, 1876 that the first words were
transmitted by wire, in the form of the well known words, "Mr. Watson, come here, I
want you." Id. at 180-81. For a general discussion of Alexander Bell, see D. EBER,
GENIUS AT WORK: IMAGES OF ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL (1982).
3. See generally J. JESPERSEN & J. FITZ-RANDOLPH, MERCURY'S WEB: THE STORY
OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1981) (a history of communication techniques).
In the past, there were several techniques for communication. As late as 1558,

ANDER GRAHAM BELL AND THE CONQUEST OF SOLITUDE
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use of wires, people were able to talk to others directly. Today, these
wires are no longer necessary because wireless communications are a
reality.4 There are millions of both cellular 5 and cordless phones' in
the English used smoke signals to communicate. Id. at 15. While the Swiss and Austrians yodelled, a very loud cry, in order to communicate from mountain peak to
mountain peak, the Africans developed a complex communication system that utilized drums. Id. at 17. By changing pitch, the drummer imitated the native people's
language. Id. The American Indians also developed a rare and complex smoke system.
Id. at 17-18. By using a blanket to control the rising smoke, the Indians could communicate great distances. Id. at 18.
Another concern of the people was communication between ships. To overcome
this difficulty, sailors developed flaghoist. Id. at 19. Flaghoist involved a set of different colored and shaped flags which in distinct combinations represented various letters. Id. All these previous systems had one element in common. They were in the
open so that anyone could hear or see them. Therefore, they all lacked privacy. Cf. id.
at 17 (African drums were not private).
With the discovery of electricity, people began to develop techniques to communicate that utilized wires. Id. at 33-37. In 1833, the Germans developed the first telegraph system. Id. at 37. Although this system was crude, the Germans were able to
communicate up to 2.3 kilometers, the length of the wire. Id. Ten years later, in 1843,
the United States authorized Samuel Morse to install telegraph wires from Washington, D.C. to Baltimore. Id. at 42. Seventeen years later, telegraph wires linked most
major U.S. cities. Id. Although people were able to communicate with others on their
continent, transatlantic communication was still difficult. Id. at 45. It was not until
1866 that the English laid the first successful under water cable. Id. at 49. The cable
connected Ireland and Newfoundland. Id. For a discussion of transatlantic communication, see A. CLARKE, VOICE ACROSS THE SEA (1974). Thirty-some years later, Guglielmo Marconi made radio communication possible. J. JESPERSEN & J. FITz-RANDOLPH,

supra, at 61-65.

4. For the number of cellular and cordless phones in use, see infra note 7.
5. Cellular phone technology was developed in 1960. Berresford, The Impact of
Law and Regulation on Technology: The Case History of Cellular Radio, 44 Bus.
LAW. 721 (1989). Cellular phones, also known as portable phones, replaced the mobile
telephone. Id. For a discussion of mobile phones, see infra note 18. A cellular phone
service supplier divides a large geographic location into honey-comb shaped "cells." S.
REP. No. 99-541, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3555, 3563 [hereinafter ADMIN. NEWS]. In each cell, there is a low powered radio
transmitter also known as a base station. Id. The phone, located in a car, operates on
radio waves. Id. In-coming or out-going calls travel between the car and the tower
over radio waves. Id. From the station, the call is either transmitted to another base
station, in which case, the frequency of the transmission is automatically changed, or
the communication enters the wire telephone lines. Id. As a car travels between cells,
the frequency of the transmission changes automatically. Id.
When this comment refers to protection of cellular and cordless phones and communications over them, this is only a reference to the radio portion of these devices.
The communication while in the normal land wire, is definitely protected by 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-11 (1988), which states "[except as otherwise specifically provided
• . . any person who willfully intercepts . . . any wire . . . communication shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." It is
only the radio portion of wireless communications that raise privacy issues.
6. Cordless phones are similar to cellular phones, in that they also operate on
radio waves. ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3563. However, cordless phones operate
over a much smaller distance. See Mauro, Law Sits Idle as "Snoops" Call The Shots,
USA Today, April 20, 1990, at 2, col. 1 (average range of cordless phone is 1000 feet
or less) [hereinafter Mauro]. A cordless phone consists of a handset and a base unit.
ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3563. The communications travel between the base
unit and hand set in the form of AM/FM radio waves. Id. Because cordless phones
operate in a "duplex mode," simultaneous transmitting occurs, which results in a con-
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use today. 7 Cordless phones are radio transmitters that operate over
distances of less than a thousand feet.' Similarily, cellular phones
are also radio transmitters that operate over greater distances.' With
the advanced technologies of cellular and cordless phones, individuals who are concerned about the confidentiality of their communications"0 are now able to use these phones to conduct business and
tinuous conversation. 48 Fed. Reg. 4788 (1983). Thus, by utilizing radio waves, the
cord of a standard telephone is eliminated, and the user has greater freedom and
mobility. Id.
7. See Sanders, Reach Out and Tape Someone, Time 55 (Jan. 1990) (21 million American households have cordless phones); see also Cordless Phones: What
Price Freedom?, Consumer Reports 680 (Nov. 1989) (one fourth of American homes
have a cordless phone) [hereinafter Consumer Reports]; Lopez, Phone Fixation: Once
High-Tech Toys, Cellular Telephones are Becoming Staples, Wall St. J.,Aug. 11,
1989, at 1, col. 1 (projected growth of cellular phones by the end of 1989 is to 3.2
million phones and subscribers).
8. Mauro, supra note 6, at 2, col. 1. For a more detailed discussion of how
cordless phones operate on radio waves, see supra note 6.
9. ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3563. For how cellular phones operate as
radio transmitters, see supra note 5.
10. See Lezin, Calling All Cars, Cellular Telephones Can Convert Commuting
Time Into Billable Hours, 8 CALIF. LAW. 77 (1988) (one in every three American Bar
Association members has a cellular phone); see also Lopez, supra note 7, at 1, col. 1
(lawyers, engineers and sales agents use cellular phones to conduct business).
Doctors also conduct business over cellular phones and are concerned about the
privacy of their communications. See Dr. G. v. Bell Ati. Mobile Phones, No. 89-1967
(E.D. Pa. July 14, 1989) (1989 WL 79354). In Dr. G., the plaintiff, a doctor, had conducted business and personal affairs from his car phone and he was concerned with
the privacy of his conversations. Id. In fact, the Dr. was so concerned with his privacy
and the privacy of his clients, that he used a pseudonym in his complaint. Id. at 3.
Another privacy issue that may arise is how communications over a cellular or
cordless phone affect the attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client privilege only
protects the client's communications to his attorney or the attorney's agent if 1) the
communication deals with the attorney giving legal advice; 2) is made with the expectation of confidentiality; 3) is not in furtherance of a future crime or tort; and 4) the
client has not waived the privilege. Spahn, Making and Breaking the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 35 PRAC. LAW. 61, 62 (1989); see generally Note, The Attorney Client Privilege, 19 U: RICH. L. REV. 559 (1985) (discussing the attorney-client privilege, scope,
limitations and application). This privilege is based on the client's expectation of privacy. Spahn, supra, at 64. Some courts have held that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when he communicates over a radio phone. For a discussion of privacy expectations over cellular and cordless phones, see infra notes 49
and 61-75 and accompanying text. Therefore, communications between the attorney
and his client may not be privileged when they use a cellular or cordless phone. For
example, if the attorney initiates the conversation from his car phone, he knows the
communication may not be private. Therefore, the attorney-client privilege never
arises. Cf. Spahn, supra, at 64 (no privilege if client did not expect privacy). However,
if the privilege existed and the attorney initiates the conversation from a cellular
phone, the attorney may have breached his ethical obligations and be subject to disciplinary actions. Cf. ILL. REV, STAT. ch. 10a, Canon 4, Rule 4-101 (1987) (disciplinary
rules); Model Rules of Professional Responsibility Rule 1.6 (1987) (confidentiality of
information). In contrast, if the client knows that the attorney is on the car phone,
and continues to communicate with him, this may act as. an express waiver of the
privilege by the client. Cf. Spahn, supra, at 66 (client may waive privilege). The express waiver may also arise when the client initiates the communication from a cellular phone. The same issues arise if the attorney or client were using a cordless phone
as opposed to a cellular phone.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 23:661

personal affairs from their backyards, cars or even airplanes." These
new phones, however, have their drawbacks.
To the surprise of many people, because cellular and cordless
phones utilize radio waves, 2 other individuals with the proper
equipment can intercept these communications."3 In order for society to use this technology or any other technology to its full potential, the law must change and advance with the change in science.
The law, therefore, must protect the privacy of these communications. Congress made an effort to advance the laws to keep pace with
the technology when it amended Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("Title III")" with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA").15 Congress'
attempt provides cellular communications protection from unauthorized interference, but leaves cordless phones unprotected.16 This
comment asserts that Congress should protect cordless phone communications just as it protects cellular communications.1 7 Part II of
11. See 49 Fed. Reg. 8, 1512 (1984) (range of cordless phone is 300 feet on average); Mauro, supra note 6, at 2, col. 1 (range of cordless phone less than 1000 feet);
see also Lopez, supra note 7, at 1, col. 1 (cellular phones are found in cars, trains,
airplanes). Suggestions are being made to place cellular phones along hiking trails.
See Lopez, supra note 7, at 1, col. 1.
With greater mobility, people can conduct their business more easily. For example, William J. Higgins, a stock trader, had for several years used a portable phone to
conduct business from the floor of the New York Stock Exchange. NYSE Ban on
Portable Phones Upheld, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 1989, at 1, col. 3. Mr. Higgins began to
use a portable phone on the floor in 1987, although he has argued for their use since
1981. Id. He claimed that the portable phone helped traders better serve their clients
and is a "cost-saving device." Id. Even against the claims of Mr. Higgins, the Securities Exchange Commission banned the use of portable phones on the floor of the New
York Stock Exchange. Id.
12. For a discussion of how cellular and cordless phones operate, see supra
notes 5 and 6.
13. For a discussion of how communications over radio telephones are not private, see infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1982) (Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Acts of 1968 as it appeared before the 1986 amendments); see ADMIN.
NEWS, supra note 5, at 3565 (purpose of ECPA is to update and clarify privacy protection under federal wiretap laws).
15. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ECPA].
16. For discussion of ECPA, see infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. One
commentator has stated:
Technology moves on. It may take the legislature years to hammer out the
definitive expressions of its wishes in an area, only to have a new technological
development render the statute meaningless, or at least not as comprehensive
as intended. For instance, a hole in the coverage of the 1968 federal wiretapping law has been opened because the act's complex definition of "wire communication" has been held not to include a recent and popular device, the
cordless telephone.
Schroeder, On Beyond Drug Testing: Employer Monitoring and the Quest for the
Perfect Worker, 36 U. KAN. L. REv. 869, 895 (1988).
17. For a discussion of why the ECPA should protect cordless phones, see infra
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this comment presents a brief background on the history of cellular
and cordless phones. Part III addresses the inadequate protection
for privacy over radio communication devices prior to 1986. In so
doing, part III examines the fourth amendment and the reasonable
expectation of privacy and Title III. Part IV reviews the present position of the law under the ECPA and explains why cordless phones
are treated differently from cellular phones. Finally, part V analyzes
possible solutions to the privacy problems that plague users of cellular and cordless phones and determines that statutory protection is
the best solution.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Cellular Phones
Although mobile phone"8 technology, the predecessor of cellular
phones, was available in the 1920's, the industry did not begin to
develop until 1949.19 About that time, American Telephone and Telegraph ("AT&T") had convinced the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to allocate frequencies from the radio spectrum for
mobile phone use.2" Because the FCC did not foresee the future demand for mobile phone technology, it only allocated a small number
of frequencies for mobile phone use.2 1 This lack of available radio
frequencies limited the mobile phone industry.2 2
By 1968, however, the FCC realized the mobile phone industry's
potential and considered allocating a large number of frequencies
for mobile phone use.2 In 1970, the FCC authorized AT&T to test a
cellular phone service in an urban setting.2 4 By 1974, the FCC apnotes 138-42 and accompanying text.
18. Mobile phones were the predecessors to cellular phones. Berresford, supra
note 5, at 723. In 1949, the FCC allocated a very small number of frequencies for

mobile phone use. Id. As a result of the limited availability of frequencies, the mobile
industry was quite small and not very efficient. Id. Instead of the multiple towers and
cells that make up a cellular phone service, there was frequently only one tower that
served an entire city. Id. at 723. For discussion of cellular phones and multiple towers, see supra note 5. This one tower area would be approximately seventy-five miles
in radius. Berresford, supra note 5, at 723. Therefore, a frequency used in one area
could not be re-used for other communications in the same area unless it was outside
the seventy-five mile area. Id. As a result of the limited number of frequencies that
were in use, the system could only handle twenty-three simultaneous conversations.
Id. Because of the limited capability of mobile phones, they "became viewed as toys
for a few 'fatcats.' " Id. at 724.
19. Berresford, supra note 5, at 723 (the mobile phone industry began in 1949).
20. Id. The FCC allocated frequencies for mobile phone use. Id.
21. Id. The FCC reasoned that the public use of same frequencies outweighed
the demand for mobile services. Id.
22. Id. at 724. The mobile phone industry could only serve a maximum of 250
customers. Id.
23. Id. at 724-25. The FCC considered high capacity mobile phone systems. Id.
24. Id. at 725. AT&T began testing cellular phones in Newark and Philadelphia.
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proved the use of cellular communications, and allocated frequencies
for cellular use.2 As a result of the frequency allocation, the cellular
industry steadily grew through 198326 and thereafter its growth accelerated up to today.27
B. Cordless Phones
Cordless phones appeared on the United States market at about
the same time the cellular industry began its testing. 8 In 1973, the
FCC authorized cordless phone use under the provisions for low
power communication devices. 29 Unlike the cellular phone industry,
however, the FCC did not require an individual to have a license to
operate a cordless phone." Because of a conflict between the unlicensed cordless phones and the licensed citizen band ("CB") operators, the FCC changed the frequency allocation for low powered
voice transmitters."1 Presently, the FCC classifies cordless phones as
restricted radiation devices.3 2 Under this classification, people may
continue to operate cordless phones without a license so long as the
energy emissions do not exceed a certain level, and the system does
not interfere with other authorized radio communications. 3
III.

PROTECTION FOR WIRELESS PHONES PRIOR TO THE ECPA
I

Prior to the amendments to the federal wiretap laws, the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution and Title III proId.

25. Id. at 725. In 1974, Bell Labs reported to the FCC that cellular phone technology was successful. Id.
26. Id. at 727 (cellular industry grew extensively). The first commercial cellular
service began on October 13, 1983, in Chicago, Illinois. 11 McGRAw-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,

Mobile Radio 289, 290 (1987). The service consisted

of 17 cells totalling 2400 square miles, and could serve a maximum of 100,000 subscribers. Id. But see supra note 18 (mobile phones could handle only twenty-three
conversations at once). Cellular phones became more efficient than mobile phones
because more cellular phones could operate at the same time by re-using the same
frequencies. 11 MCGRAW-HILL, supra, at 290.
27. See 11 McGRAW-HILL, supra note 26, at 290 (cellular services had spread to
all other major United State cities by 1985).
28. See In re American Telecommunications Corp. and Elec. Indus. Assoc., 91
F.C.C.2d 362, 363 (1982) (cordless phones entered the market in 1973).
29. Id. When cordless phones first appeared, they operated between 26.9-27.3
MHz. Id.
30. Id. Cordless phones could operate under Subpart D of Part 15 of FCC Rules
without an individual license. Id.
31. Id. at 363-64. The FCC faced enforcement problems because of a conflict
between cordless phones and CB operators. Id.
32. In re American Telecommunications Corp. and Elec. Indus. Assoc., 91
F.C.C.2d 362, 365 (1982). Cordless phones are now classified as radiation devices and
can operate without an individual license under § 15.7 of FCC rules. Id.
33. Id. The FCC placed restrictions on the energy output of cordless phones. Id.
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tected telephone communications.3 4 While the fourth amendment
only protects individuals from public agents and governmental surveillance, Title III provided protection from both government agents
and private citizens.3 5
A.

The Fourth Amendment and the Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy

6
In the seminal case Katz v. United States,"
the Supreme Court
37
defined the criteria for a constitutional fourth amendment search.
The Court held that the fourth amendment protects people and not
places. 3 8 In order for the fourth amendment to protect an individual's privacy, the individual must exhibit a. subjective expectation of
privacy that is reasonable under the circumstances." The Court

34. See generally Note, Title III Protection For Wireless Telephones, 1985 U.
ILL. L. REV. 143 (discussing Title III protection for radio telephones). Congress passed
Title III to regulate federal electronic surveillance of wire and oral communications.
Id.
The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (1791).
35. See Note, supra note 34, at 146 (Title III prevents a private citizen from
willfully intercepting wire or oral communications); see also Note, Private Interceptions of Wire and Oral Communications Under Title III: Rethinking Congressional
Intent, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 181, 185, 187 (1987) (Title III prohibited all unauthorized
eavesdropping by both private persons and government officials) [hereinafter Note,
Title III]; Comment, Cordless Telephones and the Fourth Amendment: A Trap for
the Unwary Consumer, 73 Ky. L.J. 1167, 1170 (1984-85) (Congress adopted Title III
to protect the privacy of wire and oral communications); Note, Don't Touch that
Dial: Radio Listening Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 416, 429 (1988) (the fourth amendment protects individuals only from
searches and seizures by government officials) [hereinafter Note, Privacy Act].
36. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
37. 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see generally Fiatal, The Electronic Communication
Privacy Act: Addressing Today's Technology, 22 PROSECUTOR 15, 16 (1988-89) (discussion of the Katz case and the fourth amendment).
38. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). The Katz court was not
concerned with what area the fourth amendment protects because the Court held
that the fourth amendment protects persons and not places. Id. Presently, there are
only three exceptions to the fourth amendment's requirement of a search warrant
before the police can conduct a search. Fiatal, supra note 36, at 16. Among these
exceptions are the search incident to an arrest, a search of an automobile and a
search pursuant to an emergency. Id. Consent by one of the parties to a communication may also permit a law officer to listen to a conversation without a warrant. Id.
The consent exception is based on the premise that the nonconsenting party "assumes the risk" that the other party will reveal the conversation to the police when
he voluntarily speaks to the consenting party. Id.
39. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (fourth amendment protection requires a subjective expectation of privacy which is reasonable); People v.
Fata, 529 N.Y.2d 683, 686, 139 Misc. 2d 979, 983 (Co. Ct. 1988) (two elements to
reasonable expectation of privacy); see also Comment, supra note 35, at 1179 (reason-
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found that surveillance of a telephone conversation constituted a
search and, therefore, was subject to the fourth amendment.4
Hence, where there was a reasonable expectation of privacy, the government could not conduct surveillance without a warrant."1
Therefore, if an individual using a cellular or cordless phone can
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy, the fourth amendment
will protect his communications. The average person, however, is
unaware that radio communications"' travel freely through the air,
and that anyone with the proper equipment can intercept them. 48
This lack of awareness has created a false impression that such communications go unintercepted. 4" Despite society's expectation that
radio communications are private, 45 in Edwards v. Bardwell,4 the
court reasoned that it only takes a basic understanding of physics to
realize that radio communications are not secure.47 Thus, according
to the Edwards court, any encyclopedia could provide enough
knowledge so that anyone with the proper equipment could intercept radio communications.48 To inform cordless phone users that
these communications may be intercepted, the FCC has required
manufacturers to mark cordless phones with a label that states communications over cordless phones are not private.4 9 This labeling reable expectation of privacy must be both subjectively and objectively reasonable).
40. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (electronic listening constituted a search and seizure
and was subject to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement).
41. Id. The Katz court held that the petitioner had a justified expectation of
privacy in a phone booth. Id.
42. For a discussion of how cellular and cordless phones utilize radio waves, see
supra notes 5 and 6.
43. See Comment, supra note 35, at 1168 (average person is unaware of technology behind cordless phones).
44. Id. The average person is unaware that with the use of radio waves, his
communications over a cordless phone are no longer private. Id.
45. Dial P. for Privacy (NBC news broadcast, special report by Rich Samuels,
Feb. 6, 1990) (people when questioned believed cordless phones were private) [hereinafter NBC news].
46. 632 F. Supp. 584 (M.D. La. 1986).
47. Id. at 586-87 (any standard encyclopedia can explain the physics behind
radio communications).
48. Id. at 586. Anyone with the proper equipment can easily intercept radio
waves. Id.
49. See Wisconsin v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 104, 438 N.W.2d 571, 577 (1989)
(FCC requires labelling of cordless phones); see also 50 Fed. Reg. 24514 (1985) (for
the public's benefit FCC requires labelling of cordless phones). The label that a cordless phone manufacturer must attach to the base unit must state:
This cordless telephone system operates under Part 15 of FCC Rules. Privacy
of communications may not be ensured when using this phone. Operation is
subject to two conditions: (1) It may not interfere with radio communications;
and (2) it must accept any interference received, including that which may
cause undesirable operation.
Telecommunication, 47 C.F.R. § 15.236 (1988) (emphasis added). The FCC has also
required manufacturers to label the cordless phone box. Id. This warning should
state:
Notice: The base units of some cordless telephones may respond to other
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quirement, and the manuals that accompany the cordless phone,
thus place the individual on notice that communication over a cor-

dless phone is not private. As a result, the label has made a subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy a legal impossibility."0
Notwithstanding the warning labels, many individuals continue

to believe that their conversations on a phone, cordless or otherwise,
are private.5 1 Nevertheless, some lower courts 2 have held that a reasonable person should not expect communications over cordless or
cellular phones to be private. Since there is no subjective or reasonable expectation of privacy, the courts do not afford the individual
any protection under the fourth amendment. 3
B. Title III Protectionfor Communications
Because the fourth amendment does not protect individuals
from private citizens intercepting telephone communications, 4 Congress passed Title III."s Under Title III, unless a court had issued a
warrant, it was illegal for government officials or private citizens to
intercept "wire communications" or "oral communications accompanied with a reasonable expectation of privacy." 6 Title III worked
well when radio communications were not prevalent, but today's advanced technological development of cellular and cordless phones
rendered Title III, as originally passed, inadequate.5 7
nearby units or radio noise, resulting in telephone calls being dialed through
this unit without your knowledge and, possibly, calls being misbilled. In order
to protect against such occurrences this cordless telephone is provided with the
following features: (to be completed by the manufacturer).
Id.
50. Wisconsin v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 104, 438 N.W.2d 571, 577 (1989). The
FCC labelling requirement has made it impossible for an individual to exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy when using a cordless phone. Id. Thus, the subjective
expectation of privacy is irrelevant. Id.
51. For a discussion of why individuals are unaware of the threat to loss of privacy over cordless phones, see supra notes 42-48.
52. For lower courts that have found that users of cellular or cordless phones do
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, see infra notes 61-75.
53. For a discussion of the fourth amendment's privacy expectation requirements, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
54. For discussion of the fourth amendment as it restricts the government, see
supra note 35.
55. See Comment, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986: The
Challenge of Applying Ambiguous Statutory Language to Intricate Telecommunication Technologies, 13 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 451, 459 (1987). Congress
passed Title III for a number of reasons. Mainly, Congress wanted to prohibit and
curtail all unauthorized surveillance and eavesdropping of wire and oral communications. Id.; see Comment, supra note 35, at 1171.
56. See Note, The Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Eavesdropping on
Cordless Telephone Conversations, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 323, 324 (1986) (Title III prohibits all private and governmental eavesdropping without a court order).
57. For a discussion of how courts have difficulty in applying Title III to radio
communications, see infra notes 61-75 and accompanying text. See also Note, Pri-
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Cellular and cordless phones both utilize radio waves to transmit communications. Therefore, they did not fit neatly into the
"wire communications" category which Title III protected., Furthermore, Title III applied to common carriers,59 which are no
longer the sole suppliers of telecommunications.0 As a result, the
courts have attempted to provide judicial protection for these
communications.61
In United States v. Hall,6 2 the issue was whether Title III pre-

vented the interception of cellular phone communications. In Hall,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted Title III in such a
manner that its interpretation led to a ridiculous result.63 The court
classified communications between a mobile phone and a land-line4
6
telephone, the ordinary telephone lines, as wire communications.
The court held that when a communication originates or ends on a
land-line telephone, the entire communication is a wire communication and protected by Title III." However, if the communication
vacy Act, supra note 35, at 430-31 (radio communications do not fit neatly into Title
III categories)..
58. For the operation of cellular and cordless phones over radio waves, see
supra notes 5 and 6; see also Comment, Privacy of Conversations Over Cordless and
Cellular Telephones: Federal Protection Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 9 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 335, 338-39 (1987) (discussion of radio
technology); Note, Privacy Act, supra note 35, at 430-31 (radio communications do
not fit neatly into Title III categories). Cordless telephones utilize low powered AM/
FM frequencies. Comment, supra, at 338-39. Cellular telephones also utilize low powered radio waves. Id.; Note, supra note 55, at 329 (cordless telephones transmit FM
radio signals).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1982). A wire communication under Title III was:
any communication made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for
the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like
connection and the point of reception furnished or operated by any person
engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the
transmission of interstate or foreign communications.
Id. (emphasis added).
60. H.R. REP. No. 647, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1986) (numerous entities other
than common carriers provide electronic communication services). One example of a
non-common carrier is private branch exchange ("PBX"). Id. PBX is equipment
owned or leased by private parties that connect their telephones and date terminals
to the local exchange carrier. Id.
61. For an explanation of how courts have tried to interpret Title III, see infra
notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
62. 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (addressed mobile phones). In Hall, a housewife, while listening to a megacycle radio, had intercepted Hall's communications. Id.
at 194-95. Hall had been speaking on a mobile phone. Id. After a month of listening
to Hall's conversations, she reported the broadcasts to the police. Id. at 195. Without
a warrant, the Arizona Department of Public Safety also began to monitor Hall's
conversations. Id. They then arrested Hall, and he was convicted for possession of
marijuana. Id. at 194.
63. Id. at 197. The Hall court stated its classification was absurd. Id.
64. Id. The Hall court held that communications between land-line and mobile
phones are wire communications. Id.
65. Id. Title III protects communications originating or ending on land-line
phones. Id.
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originates and ends on mobile telephones, the communication is oral
and not protected by Title III."6 This illogical distinction by the
court's own admission is absurd." At some point of both a land-line
to a mobile or mobile to mobile communication, the communication
leaves the wire.
In Edwards v. BardweU1,6s a case that also addressed whether
cellular phone users had a privacy expectation under Title III,9 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that communications which
originated over radio telephones were oral communications."0 Thus,
Title III, which statutorily required a reasonable expectation of privacy for oral communications, did not protect radio telephones.7
Since anyone who wanted to intercept radio waves could do so, there
was no reasonable expectation of privacy for cellular phone users. 2
Finally, in Rhode Island v. Delaurier,73 the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island examined whether cordless phone users had a privacy
expectation protected by Title III.7 The Delaurier court held that
cordless phones were not wire communications and therefore not
protected by Title III.7 Furthermore, the court found that cordless
phone users were analogous to cellular phone users in that they have
no justifiable expectation of privacy.76 The case law illustrates the
66. Id. (Title III does not protect communications that both originate and end
on mobile phones).
67. See id. (court admitted its distinction was absurd); see also Wisconsin v.
Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 99, 438 N.W.2d 571, 575-76 (1989) (Hall decision routinely
criticized).
68. 632 F. Supp. 584 (M.D. La. 1986). In Edwards, Doe, using a Bearcat scanner, intercepted Edwards' cellular communication. Id. at 586. Edwards had been
speaking to his attorney about criminal activity. Id. Doe taped the conversation and
presented the tape to the U.S. Attorney, Bardwell, who prepared a manuscript of the
tape. Id. Edwards initiated a civil action under 18 U.S.C. § 2520 against Bardwell. Id.
at 585. The court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment. Id. at 589.
69. Id. The Edwards court addressed the privacy of cellular phones. Id.
70. Id. at 589. When either end of a communication originates over a radio
phone, it is an oral communication. Id.
71. Id. at 587-89. Without a reasonable expectation of privacy, Title III could
not protect radio communications as oral communications. Id.
72. Id. at 587-89. Since there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for communications over cellular phones, Title III cannot protect these communications as
oral communications. Id. Title III only protects an oral communication if the person
uttered it "exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1982).
73. 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985). In Delaurier,a young boy, while listening to his
AM radio, intercepted Delaurier's cordless phone communication. Id. at 690. The
boy's mother learned of the conversation and contacted the police, who used the boy's
radio to monitor Delaurier's conversations. Id. For the next several weeks, the police
heard several conversations that dealt with the sale of drugs, gambling and prostitution. Id. With a search warrant, the police arrested Delaurier. Id.
74. Id. The Delaurier court examined the privacy of cordless phones under Title III. Id.
75. Id. at 693-94. The Delaurier court held that Title III does not protect the
privacy of cordless phones. Id.
76. Id. at 694. For examples of other courts that have addressed cellular or cor-
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courts' unwillingness to find a reasonable expectation of privacy for
those who communicate over cellular and cordless phones.7 Without
judicial recognition of a reasonable expectation of privacy, the
fourth amendment provides no protection for these wireless communications. In addition, Title III was insufficient because the courts
could not realistically interpret the statute in a manner that would
7
protect radio communications the same as wire communications. 1
Therefore, in 1986, Congress amended Title III in order to protect
79
the privacy of cellular phone users.
IV.

THE ECPA: PRESENT PROTECTION FOR CELLULAR AND CORDLESS
PHONE USERS

In response to the cellular phone industry's heavy lobbying, s"
Congress amended Title III of the federal wiretapping laws to provide protection for some radio communications." Titled the ECPA,
the 1986 amendments to Title III protect cellular phones by including cellular phones in the definition of wire communication.' The
Act, however, explicitly excluded cordless phones from its protection. 8 Consequently, although Congress completely removed the
dless phones and found no reasonable expectation of privacy, see Tyler v. Berodt, 877
F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989) (no reasonable expectation of privacy for cordless phones),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 723 (1990); United States v. Hoffa, 436 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir.
1970) (fourth amendment does not protect mobile phone communications); Kansas v.
Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (Title III does not protect cordless telephones); People v. Fata, 529 N.Y.S.2d 683, 139 Misc. 2d 979 (Co. Ct. 1988) (ECPA
excludes cordless phones); Wisconsin v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571
(1989) (protection for cordless phones must come from the fourth amendment).
77. For courts that have found no reasonable expectation of privacy, see supra
notes 61-75.
78. See supra note 62 and accompanying text for a discussion on the absurdity
of the court's reasoning in Hall.
79. See ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3559 (Congress must act to protect privacy). As long as Congress acts pursuant to an enumerated constitutional power, Congress can legislatively provide for more rights than the constitution does, but cannot
limit those already granted by the constitution. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316
(1819). Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8. Article I § 8 states: "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
Several states, and with the Indian Tribes." Id. Congress passed the ECPA pursuant
to the commerce clause. See ECPA § 2510 (congressional findings). The legislature
has not guaranteed that the communications on cellular phones will remain private.
Instead, it guarantees a remedy for those whose communications were unlawfully intercepted. For the ECPA protections, see infra notes 81-86. In passing the ECPA,
Congress did not statutorily create a reasonable expectation of privacy for those who
communicate over a cellular phone but removed the requirement of establishing a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
80. See generally Hearings, supra note 1, in which several representatives from
the cellular industry testified at the hearings.
81. For a discussion of cellular phone protection under the ECPA, see infra
note 82.
82. See ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3565 for a discussion that cellular phones
are definitely "wire communications" and protected by ECPA.
83. See ECPA § 2510. A wire communication "does not include the radio por-
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need to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy for cellular
phone communications, cordless phone communications are still
without the protection they need. 4
The ECPA authorizes a court to exclude from use at trials evidence obtained from the unauthorized reception of cellular phones."
Those who commit the unauthorized receptions are also subject to
criminal penalties.8 Furthermore, the ECPA allows the offended
party to bring a civil action against the person who intercepted the
communications.8 7 However, the ECPA provides for, in certain instances, procedures that would allow authorized reception of cellular
communications."
In contrast, Congress has not provided any protection for cordless phone users.8 8 Congress justified the different treatment for
tion of a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the cordless
telephone handset and the base unit." Id. § 2510(1). An electronic communication
does not include "the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that is
transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit." Id. §
2510(12)(A). Since the ECPA prohibits disclosure of wire, oral and electronic communications, and cordless phones are neither a wire nor an electronic communication,
the ECPA does not protect cordless phones as such. Instead, cordless phones are oral
communications, but do not fulfill the requirement for oral communication protection. The Title III standard for oral communications remained unchanged in the
ECPA. In Edwards v. State Farm Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 535 (8th Cir. 1987), the court
concluded the cordless phone conversation was an oral communication. Id. at 538.
However, since there was no reasonable expectation of privacy for cordless phone
communications, the ECPA did not protect it as an oral communication either. Id.;
see Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 723
(1990) (cordless phone communication is oral). The privacy expectation for an oral
communication under the ECPA is the same as the privacy expectation requirement
for fourth amendment analysis. Tyler, 877 F.2d at 706. Under both requirements, the
person must exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id.
84. For a discussion of how the ECPA protects cellular phones, see supra note
82.
85. ECPA § 2515. This section provides the amendment's exclusionary rule, and
states:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be
received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any
court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this
chapter.
Id.
86. ECPA § 2511(4)(b)(ii). If the offender intercepts a cellular communication,
and this is his first offense, he "shall be fined not more than $500." Id.
87. See ECPA § 2520 (recovery of civil damages authorized).
88. See ECPA §§ 2516-18. A federal judge may authorize the Federal Bureau of
Investigation or its agent to intercept a wire, oral or electronic communication. ECPA
§ 2516(1). The judge may issue the order provided there is evidence of one of the
several enumerated crimes. ECPA § 2526(1)(a)-(e). The ECPA also allows the state
courts to issue interception orders. ECPA § 2516(2). Section 2518 provides for disclosure of the intercepted communication, while section 2519 provides the procedure
to intercept a wire, oral or electronic communication. See ECPA §§ 2518, 2519.
89. For specific sections of the Act that exclude cordless phones, see supra note
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these seemingly similar technologies on the ground that it was unwilling to protect communications which were so easily intercepted.90 Based on this premise, Congress specifically excluded the
radio portion of a cordless phone communication from ECPA protection.9 1 Because Congress believed cellular phone communications
were more difficult to intercept, and special or sophisticated radios
were required to intercept these communications,92 Congress was
willing to protect cellular phone use.9 s Congress' belief is invalid because people with televisions, video cassette recorders and scanners
can easily intercept cellular communications. 4 Similarly, people can
intercept cordless phone communications with AM/FM radios and
other devices.9 5 Because both cellular and cordless communications
are easily intercepted, Congress' discriminatory treatment of cordless communications under the ECPA is unjustified.
The more likely explanation for Congress' discriminatory treatment is the lobbying efforts of the cellular phone industry. Several
representatives of the cellular industry and individual cellular phone
manufacturers testified at the Congressional hearings. 7 The industry was concerned that cellular communications would go unprotected if cellular communications were not covered under the
ECPA.s s Manufacturers testified that the amendments should pro83.
90. See ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3566 (inappropriate to make criminal
interception of cordless phones). Because cordless phones are easily intercepted, Congress excluded them from the Act. Id.; see Fiatal, supra note 37, at 21 (cordless
phones are easily intercepted).
91. For a discussion of how the ECPA specifically excludes cordless phones, see
supra note 83.
92. See ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3563 (cellular phones are difficult to
intercept).
93. For a discussion of how the ECPA covers cellular phones, see supra note 82
and accompanying text.
94. See Comment, supra note 58, at 346 (cellular calls can be intercepted by
UHF televisions, channels 80-83 and VCR's); see also Note, Privacy Act, supra note
35, at 424 and n.60 (televisions and scanners intercept cellular phones).
95. See State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (intercepted cordless call on AM/FM radio); see also Comment, Privacy Versus Law Enforcement Can the Two be Reconciled?, 57 CINN. L. REV. 315, 334 (1988) (AM radios can intercept cordless communications).
96. See supra note 80 and infra note 97 discussing how the cellular industry
was a major force at the ECPA hearings.
97. See, e.g., Hearings,supra note 1 (Quigley as representative of Pactel Mobile
Co., Maker as representative for Cellular Telecommunications Industry and Stanton
from Telecater Network of America). The cellular industry wanted amendments to
protect the privacy of cellular phones? See id. at 212, 214 (statement of Jones Knapp,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Dept. of Justice).
98. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 33-34 (Congress must explicitly cover electronic communications). The cellular industry was concerned about the recent cases
of United States v. Hall, 436 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hoffa, 436
F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1970); Dorsey v. Florida, 402 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 1981); Kansas v.
Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984); Rhode Island v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688
(R.I. 1985). Id. It feared that privacy over cellular phones would go unprotected if
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tect the privacy of cellular communications. 9 In contrast, the cordless phone industry and manufacturers were noticeably absent
from the Congressional records of the ECPA hearings."' 0 In fact, the
hearings only briefly addressed cordless phones. 1 ' Because both
types of communications are easily intercepted, Congress should
protect both communications equally.
Without ECPA protection, an individual must rely on other legal theories for protection. Lower courts, however, have rejected the
fourth amendment as an alternative source of protection for cordless
phones because cordless phone users do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 0 2 In the absence of a reasonable expectation of
privacy, the fourth amendment does not protect cordless phone
users. Furthermore, the fourth amendment does not restrict the actions of private citizens.'0 3 Instead, the offended party only has state
remedies, such as suits based on the common law tort of invasion of
privacy which includes, intrusion upon seclusion,' 4 publication of
Congress did not act. Id.
99. See generally Hearings, supra note 1 (cellular industry seeking ECPA
protection).
100. Id. (the cordless industry as a whole was absent from the hearings).
101. Id. Cordless phones were not the focus of the hearings. Id.
102. For a discussion of fourth amendment protection, see supra notes 35-40
and accompanying text. For a discussion of decisions that have addressed privacy
issues for cordless phones, see supra notes 71 and 76. For an analysis of the common
law protection of privacy in this context, see infra notes 104-06, 108; see generally
Comment, supra note 57, at 348 (limited protection for cordless phones under Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982), recodified at 47 U.S.C. § 705(a)).
The Communication Act of 1934 provided protection for wire and radio communications prior to Title III. Edwards v. State Farm Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 535, 537-39 (8th
Cir. 1987). Congress amended the Communication Act the same time it passed Title
III. Id. The wiretap law took priority over the Communication Act. Id. At least two
courts have held that although the Communication Act does not require an expectation of privacy, the offended individual must establish this fact. Id. See United States

v. Rose, 669 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1982) (since the Communication Act is subject to
Title III, the Act must also require an expectation of privacy).
The Communications Act of 1934 prevents all unauthorized disclosure of radio
communications. The Communication Act 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (Supp. IV 1982). See
Comment, supra note 58, at 348. The Act also provides civil remedies as well as criminal punishment. 47 U.S.C. § 605(d). Under this Act, the individual must establish
both an interception followed by a revealing of the communication. Id. However, the
Communication Act does not seem to be an adequate remedy. See Tyler v. Berodt,
877 F.2d 705, 707"(8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 723 (1990) (plaintiff pleaded
and failed on claims under the Communication Act); see also Edwards v. State Farm
Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff's car phone communications not
protected by Communication 'Act).
103. For an explanation of the fourth amendment as it applies to government
officials, see supra note 35.
104. See Prosser, Privacy, 18 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 389-92 (1960). The common
law action based on intrusion upon the seclusion or solitude of another may provide a
civil remedy for an individual whose communications were intercepted. The intrusion
must be in the nature of prying and objectionable to a reasonable man. Id. at 390-91.
Also, "the area or thing into which someone pries must be, and be entitled to be,
private." Id. at 391. The tort extends to eavesdropping and wire tapping. Id. at 390.
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embarrassing private facts'05 and objectionable false light.Oe
For example, a claim for intrusion upon seclusion would be
based on an eavesdropping theory. 10 7 But once again, the offended
party would have difficulty winning on the merits because of the
need to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area intruded upon. 08 In some instances, if the intercepting party discloses
lies about the offended party, the offended party may be able to
base a cause of action on the tort of defamation. 0 9
These common law remedies are inadequate. Unless the Supreme Court addresses the fourth amendment issue and finds a reasonable expectation of privacy, the legislature should provide protection for cordless phones. In January of 1990, the Supreme Court
had the opportunity to address this issue when Tyler v. Berodt" °
came before the Court. The Court, however, denied the writ of cerHowever, because there is no expectation of privacy for cordless phones, an individual
probably could not meet the burden of establishing the common law tort of intrusion
upon seclusion. For cases that deal with intrusion upon seclusion, see Wolf v.
Regardie, 553 A.2d 1213 (D.C. App. 1989); Melvin v. Burling, 141 Ill. App. 3d 786, 490
N.E.2d 1011 (Ill. App. 3rd Dist. 1986); Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 178 Mich. App.
230, 443 N.W.2d 382 (Mich. App. 1989).
105. Prosser, supra note 104, at 392-98. The elements of this tort are a public
disclosure (publicity) of private facts which would be offensive to a reasonable person.
Id. Therefore, where a person intercepts a cordless communication and then discloses
it to another party, he may be liable for a public disclosure of private embarrassing
facts. However, the offended individual probably would not succeed on this cause of
action. In Edwards v. State Farm Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1987), the plaintiff
pleaded an invasion of privacy based on Louisiana tort law. Id. The Edwards court
held this claim must also fail for the same reasons the Communication Act and wiretap claims failed: there was no reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 541. Since
recovery is limited to disclosure of private facts, the plaintiff could not succeed on the
issue. Id. "No right to privacy attaches to material in the public view." Id. at 541
(citing Jaubert v. Crowing Post Signal, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1386, 1388 (La. 1979). For
further discussion of this tort, see Corcoran v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 572 S.W.2d
212 (Mo. 1978).
106. See Prosser, supra note 104, at 398-401. The tort of objectionable false
light involves the disclosure of facts that place the individual in a false light and
would be objectionable to a reasonable person. Id. at 400. The false light does not
have to be defamatory. Id.
107. See supra note 104 (eavesdropping as intrusion upon seclusion).
108. See supra note 104 (noting necessity of reasonable expectation of privacy
to prevail under intrusion upon seclusion).
109. See W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, ON TORTS, 802 (5th ed. 1984). When an
individual intercepts a cordless phone call, and then communicates what he heard, he
may be liable for slander. Slander occurs when someone orally publicizes to a third
person defamatory remarks about another. Id. For example, in Tyler v. Berodt, 877
F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 723 (1990), the Dixons, who intercepted Tyler's cordless phone calls, thought he was a drug dealer. See Sanders, supra
note 7, at 55. The Dixons then communicated this belief to the police. Id. Tyler was
not a drug dealer, but instead he was a burglar. Id. This scenario could be slander on
the part of the Dixons.
110. Tyler v. Berodt, 110 S. Ct. 723 (1990) (first opportunity for Supreme Court
to address privacy of cordless phones).
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tiorari."' Tyler applied for a writ of certiorari after the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that cordless phone communications
were not protected by federal law because Tyler did not have a justifiable expectation of privacy."1 2 As cordless phone use increases, the
Supreme Court may again have the opportunity to address this
issue.
V.

SOLUTIONS TO THE INADEQUATE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY FOR
CORDLESS PHONES

Several writers and the cellular industry itself have offered solutions to the problem of how to protect radio communications from
unauthorized interference. One possible solution to guarantee that
communications remain private is not to use radio phone technology
at all."' Instead, if an individual must communicate in confidence,
'he should use the ordinary line telephones" 4 which are covered by
the ECPA."5 Because radio technology is so widespread and most
telephone calls today are not completely transmitted within a
wire," 6 this is no longer a practical solution.
A second solution requires devices that encrypt radio communications. 1 7 By scrambling the communication, people who intercept
the conversation would not be able to understand them."" Encrypting communications, however, substantially increases the cost of radio phones." 9 The expense associated with encrypting thus makes
111. Id.; see Briggs, Cordless Phone User Loses on Privacy Plea, Chi. Sun
Times., Jan. 9, 1990, at 5; see also Ruling on Telephone Privacy Unchanged, Chi.
Daily L. Bull., Jan. 8, 1990, at 1.
112. Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706-07 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 728 (1990) (federal act required a privacy expectation for protection).
113. See Note, Privacy Act, supra note 35, at 444 (when sensitive conversation,
avoid radio phones); see also NBC news, supra note 45 (best way to insure privacy of
communications is not to use cordless phones).
114. See supra note 113 (to insure privacy do not use radio phones).
115. ECPA §§ 2510(1) and 2511 (protection for wire communications).
116. See Fiatal, supra note 37, at 17. Today, no telephone call is completely
transmitted by wire. Id. The common telephone call, not only a cordless or cellular
phone, at some point is transmitted by radio waves. Id. A call may travel through the
air as microwave transmissions and via satellite. Id. The ECPA, however, covers these
transmissions. Id.; see ECPA § 2510(1); see also ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3566
(wire communications includes long distance satellite or microwave facilities).
117. See ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3569. Encrypting is a process that
scrambles radio signals and makes them intelligible. Id. The purpose of encrypting is
to protect the contents of the communication. Id. One type of encrypting that Congress approves of is data encrypting standard. Id.; see generally Note, Privacy Act,
supra note 35, at 425 and nn.20-25 (discussing encrypting and scrambling).
118. See ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3569 (encrypted signals are not readily
accessible to the general public).
119. See Comment, supra note 58, at 345 n.66 (cost of cordless phone with security device is $179); see also Consumer Reports, supra note 7, at 682 ("clever technology has yet to squelch eavesdropping"). The cost of cordless phones without security devices range between $50 and $150. Consumer Reports, supra note 7, at 680.
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encrypting a less favored solution.
The cellular industry has suggested a third solution that concerns the reception devices. The industry suggests manufacturers of
scanners, televisions, radios and all other radio receiving devices alter production of these devices 2 ' so that these devices do not have
the ability to receive those frequencies allocated for cellular and cordless phone use. 2 ' Since there are already millions of reception devices in existence, the effect of this solution may not be felt for
' Therefore,23this solution does not provide immediate relief
years. "22
1

nor is it practical.

A fourth solution is for the FCC to change the frequency allocation for cellular and cordless phone use.124 The FCC could allocate a
frequency band for cellular and cordless phones to frequencies
outside the allocation ban for stereos and scanners. Such a requirement would allow the cellular and cordless phone industries to produce phones that existing common electronic equipment could not
intercept. 25 In order for this solution to be effective, however, the
FCC would also have to strictly regulate the manufacturers of radio
frequency devices. 26 The FCC does not presently restrict manufacturers in what frequencies the devices may receive. 2 7 To remedy
Most of the current technology on cordless' phones only prevent piracy. Id. at 682.
Piracy is when one cordless phone makes calls through another person's cordless
phone base unit. Id. The result is that the non-owner's calls are billed to the owner's
bill. Id.
120. See Hearings,supra note 1, at 29 (FCC should limit frequencies scanners
can receive).
121. 4 F.C.C. Rcd. 2085, 2086 (discusses blocking). The process by which a manufacturer produces radio receiving devices with the inability to receive certain frequencies is known as blocking. Id. Most scanners are capable of receiving cellular
communications. See Mauro, supra note 6, at 2, col. 1. Those that cannot receive
cellular frequencies, however, can easily be modified to receive them. Id.
122. Cf. 4 F.C.C. Rcd. at 2086 (some manufacturers are already voluntarily altering production to omit certain frequencies). The FCC, however, is not willing to
compel manufacturers to block frequencies. Id.
123. Blocking is not practical because many frequencies used for protected communications under the ECPA are also allocated for non-protected communications. 4
F.C.C. Rcd. at 2085. By blocking, users would not be able to purchase devices to
receive unprotected and public broadcasts.
124. Cordless phones can presently only operate under a frequency within 10
KHz of 46.610-49.970 MHz. Telecommunication, 47 C.F.R. § 15.232. The FCC has
authorized cellular phones to operate between 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz. Id. §
22.900. When the previous frequency allocations are compared with the allocations
for AM, FM, television receivers and scanners there is a noticeable overlap. This is
why radio communications are intercepted. The AM broadcast band is 535-1605 KHz.
Id. § 73.14. The FM broadcast band is 88-108 MHz. Id. § 73.201. While the television
broadcast band is 54-806 MHz, Id. § 73.602, scanners operate on 30-890 MHz. Id. §
15.4(v).
125. For a listing of the frequency allocation overlaps, see supra note 124.
126. . A radio frequency device is a receiver capable of receiving electromagnetic
energy at any frequency between 9 KHz and 3,000,000 MHz of the radio spectrum. 47
C.F.R. § 15.3 (1989).
127. See generally Telecommunication, 47 C.F.R. § 15 (certain requirements for
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this situation, the FCC would have to mandate that the manufacturers could only produce these devices with the ability to receive the
radio frequencies presently allocated for TV's and FM and AM
receivers.
The final solution, legislative protection for cordless phone
users, is the most preferable solution to the ridiculous discriminatory treatment accorded cordless phones. Although Congress has already taken steps that protect cellular phone users,12 the justification for treating cordless phones differently from cellular phones is
no longer valid. 29 Both types of communications are easily intercepted.'30 Therefore, Congress should now include cordless phone
communications in the ECPA's definition of wire communications. 1 ' By taking this step, Congress would remove the need to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy for actions involving an
invasion of privacy in communications over cordless phones.132 Instead, the offended party would have to show that the intercepting
party intentionally intercepted the cordless communication.
The ECPA only prohibits "intentional" interception and disclosure. 3 ' Congress did not purport to punish an individual for accidentally receiving or intercepting a cellular phone communication. 34
Since Congress' intention was not to punish the accidental reception
of cellular communications, the same analysis applies in the cordless
phone context. 3 5 An individual who accidentally intercepted a cormarketing, but does not restrict the device in what frequency they can receive). See
supra notes 122-23 (FCC not willing to compel blocking).
128. For an explanation of the ECPA's protection of cellular telephones, see
supra note 79.
129. For Congress' justification for discriminatory treatment, see supra notes 90
and 92 and accompanying text.
130. For a discussion of how easily cellular and cordless phone communications
are intercepted, see supra notes 93 and 94.
131. See Comment, supra note 58, at 350 (ECPA should be amended to include
cordless phones).
132. For a discussion of Congress' power to pass the ECPA, see supra note 79.
133. See ECPA § 2511(1)(a). This section provides the state of mind the offender must have in order to be subject to the ECPA. Id. The ECPA covers one who
"intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire oral, or electronic communication." Id.
(emphasis added). This intent requirement is also found in §§ 2511(1)(b)-(d).
134. Prior to the ECPA, the culpable state of mind under Title III was willful.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)-(d) (1982). Congress, however, changed the state of mind
requirement from willful to intentional in order to clarify culpability under the
ECPA. See ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3560. The change reflects Congress' desire
not to punish inadvertent reception of communications. Id. Congress made the
change in response to the concerns of radio hobbyists. Id.
Under the ECPA, intent is to mean more than a voluntary act. Id. at 3577. Instead, intent is to mean when "one's state of mind is intentional as to one's conduct
or the result of one's conduct if such conduct or result is one's conscious objective."
Id.
135. For a disucssion of how the ECPA does not punish accidental interception,
see supra note 133.
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dless phone communication would not be subject to the ECPA.' 6
Assuming, arguendo, that cordless phone communications are easier
to intercept, this only means people are more likely to accidentally
intercept them.
If the ECPA focuses on intent, it should not matter how hard
an individual may work in order to intentionally receive or intercept
a communication.137 The interceptor of radio communications is
analogous to a burglar. The law punishes a person as a burglar no
matter how hard he had to work to enter the house.' 38 Since the law
does not treat a burglar who broke a window to enter a house any
differently from a burglar who entered the house through an open
window, the law should not treat an individual living next door to
someone who owns and uses a cordless phone, and knows he can
listen to his neighbor if he actively and purposely tunes his radio to
the right frequency any differently from someone who owns a scanner and purposely tunes his scanner to the right frequency. Both
parties are making an effort to intercept a communication and are
intending the consequences of their actions, to intercept the communication, 39 just as a burglar intends to enter the house by any
means and commit a felony. The culpable state of mind is present,
and there are similar acts by both individuals. Therefore, the courts
should have the ability under the law to punish both parties equally.
136. Cf. ECPA § 2511 (only intentional interception prohibited).
137. Cf. United States v. Rose, 669 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1982) (§ 605 protected
radio communications regardless of the ease of which others could intercept them);
United States v. Suglin, 226 F.2d 281, 286 (9th Cir. 1955) (ease of interception under
Communications Act did not matter); United States v. Laughlin, 226 F. Supp. 112,
114 (D.D.C. 1964) (Communication Act protected privacy no matter how easily communication was monitored).
138. See, e.g., Lucas v. Wainright, 604 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1979) (breaking and
entering constitutes the same crime as entering without breaking); Sweezy v. Garrison, 554 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. N.C. 1982) (pushing open an unlocked door constitutes a
breaking for purposes of burglary); People v. Davis, 54 Ill. App. 3d 517, 369 N.E.2d
1376 (4th Dist. 1977) (use of force in entry is not a necessary element of burglary);
People v. Shannon, 28 Ill. App. 3d 873, 329 N.E.2d 399 (1st Dist. 1975) (open door
not a defense to burglary).
139. Cf. ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 5, at 3578 (acts can be intentional, regardless
of whether one has evil purpose). Congress believed that those who steal to get
money, whether they just enjoy it or want to aid the less fortunate, all commit the
same crime. Id. If this is Congress' belief, why does Congress not treat those who
intercept cordless phone communications criminals? If it were not for being specifically excluded, a person intercepting a cordless call would fulfill the ECPA's intent
requirement. They intend to intercept the communication just as one who intends to
intercept a cellular communication. See generally Note, Privacy Act, supra note 35,
at 437-42 (discussion of ECPA's intent requirement). One commentator has stated
that the courts should determine intentional interception, by deciding if the individual was involved in active surveillance or passive reception. Id. at 438. Active surveillance is information gathering from a focused and particular target. Id. Passive reception does not have a target. Id. at 439. The ECPA is to prevent surveillance. Id. at
438. If this is true, then the passive reception is accidental, and not subject to the
ECPA. Id.

1990)

Discriminatory Treatment for Similar Technology

If Congress included cordless phones in the ECPA's ambit of
protection, the Act would still cover only those government agents
or private citizens who intentionally receive or reveal these communications.' 40 Such intentional conduct is precisely what our laws
should prohibit. Therefore, the protection the ECPA provides for
cellular phones, excluding illegally obtained communications from a
trial, affording victims a civil cause of action against eavesdroppers'' and subjecting the eavesdropper to criminal penalties, such
as a fine or imprisonment 42 is equally suited to cordless communications. The ECPA would not prevent the interception of cordless
phone communications, but instead would provide a remedy for the
aggrieved party.
VI.

CONCLUSION

A person's mobility and freedom when making a telephone call
are no longer limited to how far the cord reaches or the location of
the nearest phone booth. With this new mobility, the courts have
said the individual gives up his privacy expectation. Congress responded with the ECPA, which protects cellular, wire and electronic
communications, but not cordless phone communications. Consequently, a person traveling around the city can communicate with
others from his car on a cellular phone and know that he has a remedy under the ECPA if someone invades his private conversation. In
contrast, a person who uses a cordless phone in the confines of his
home, expecting the law to protect his privacy, has no remedy if a
person intentionally intercepts his cordless communication. Today,
there is no meaningful difference between cellular and cordless
phones for regulation purposes. Congress' feigned distinction is a
distinction without a difference.
Whether an individual communicating over a cordless phone
has a reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the fourth
amendment remains unanswered by the Supreme Court. Many have
offered solutions to the privacy concerns left unprotected by the
Court. The obvious and easiest solution, however, is to include cordless phones in the ECPA. By so doing, Congress would give millions of people who presently use cordless phones the protection and
remedies due them for intentional invasions of their privacy.
Timothy R. Rabel

140.
141.
142.

ECPA § 2511(1)(a) (applies to anyone who intentionally intercepts).
ECPA §§ 2515 and 2520 (exclusionary rule and civil remedies).
ECPA § 2511(4) (punishment for intentional interception).

